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the Ivory tower and the Fourth Estate
Paul Lashmar
In early 2013 the disaffected National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward 
Snowden sought out two campaigning journalists, filmmaker Laura Poitras and 
Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald. Snowden then provided Poitras and Green-
wald with access to the tranche of up to 1.7 million classified NSA documents that, 
among other significant issues, revealed the massive growth in surveillance capability 
of the “Five Eyes” network of signals intelligence agencies of the US, UK, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Using the pseudonym “Verax,” Snowden was also in 
contact with Barton Gellman, an investigative journalist with national security exper-
tise working for the Washington Post. Another investigative journalist with national 
security reporting experience, Ewen MacAskill from the Guardian, joined the Poitras- 
Greenwald team in Hong Kong to structure and coordinate the release of their stories 
beginning in June 2013. Over the next months, investigative journalists from major 
news organizations across many countries cooperated with the core team to release 
documents into their regional media. 
The Snowden documents caused a worldwide sensation and a polarizing debate 
in the Five Eyes countries about the merits of publication. Gen. Keith B. Alexan-
der, then director of the NSA, said in June 2013, “These leaks have caused signifi-
cant and irreversible damage to our nation’s security.” He added, “The irresponsible 
release of classified information about these programs will have a long- term detri-
mental impact on the intelligence community’s ability to detect future attacks.”1 Sir 
Iain Lobban, the director of Britain’s Government Communication Headquarters 
(GCHQ), said his spies had picked up “near- daily discussion” of the unauthorized 
disclosures among his agency’s targets. His colleague Sir John Sawers, the head of 
the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), was even more critical. “It’s clear that our 
adversaries are rubbing their hands in glee,” he told a British parliamentary commit-
tee. “Al Qaeda is lapping it up.”2 Heads of other Five Eyes eavesdropping agencies 









































at work, and the Guardian and Washington Post shared a Pulitzer Prize for their work 
on the Snowden story.
An anthropological method is to look for the silences in any situation, and 
when it came to the Snowden leaks, one group had surprisingly little impact on 
this splenetic public debate. A group of specialists, drawn from universities across 
the world, spend their time monitoring, researching, advising, and critiquing intel-
ligence. For all their research activity, these academics did not alert the public to 
a massive growth in the Five Eyes signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, with 
its concomitant potential not only for global mass surveillance but also Orwellian 
nation- state control. Furthermore, it took years for these academics to produce 
substantive responses to the Snowden documents in academic journals. The ques-
tion this chapter addresses is, If academic responses are so delayed, what impact 
do they really have on policy about a controversial issue like global surveillance? Is 
scholarship there for the sake of scholarship? Or as intelligence studies academic 
Peter Gill asks, “If journalists produce the first draft of history, do academics pro-
duce the second?”3
This chapter was commissioned to explore what academics might learn from 
investigative journalists and whether cooperation between the two groups is possible 
in a more formal setting. First, I describe the two cohorts and some of the conditions 
they work under. Then I explore the commonalities and the differences between the 
two groups before considering the lessons academics can learn. At various points 
I compare the two groups to a third group—the intelligence community—as this 
community is the common point of research for both journalists and academics in 
what is an overlapping Venn diagram of three professional fields. To help concep-
tualize how the groups function, I find Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory useful. In his 
lifetime he applied it to the “field” of journalism, among other groups, and it was 
further elucidated by Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu. I suggest that this theory 
describes better than other theories the relational self- reinforcing environment of 
journalism I know and that it could equally well be applied to the academy or 
the intelligence community. Within field theory Bourdieu proposed the concepts 
of habitus, which can be summarized as “socialized subjectivity,” and doxa, or the 
“universe of tactic presuppositions.” Both concepts are apposite, but in this chapter 
his concept of illusio has the most relevance. It describes “an agent’s emotional and 
cognitive ‘investment’ in the stakes involved in any field,” or more simply, the belief 
that the game is worth playing.4 
A note of caution is that the cohorts of journalists and academics relevant to this 
discussion are relatively small, and this chapter tries to steer a path, making some 
general observations and suggestions, while recognizing that some dominant figures 
within the considered cohorts challenge those generalizations. Another point of fact 
is that the author is British and a journalism practitioner academic, so while the 
chapter refers to the landscape in the Five Eyes countries, it does tend to call on UK 
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Describing the Cohorts 
Who Are the Journalists Covering Intelligence? 
Kenneth Payne notes that covering national security for the mainstream media draws 
in what he defines as the “access,” the “clippings,” and the “investigative” journalists.5 
The access journalists are those for whom national security is their specialism, or beat. 
They tend to be experienced staff journalists as the beat is recognized as a difficult, if 
not the most difficult, one. One distinct feature of national security reporting is how 
challenging it is to cultivate meaningful contacts. In any beat the reporter needs not 
only the official media contacts for the organization but knowledgeable individuals 
formerly of or within the organization who are prepared to talk on a confidential 
basis and may challenge the official line.6 These reporters are, in effect, access or 
lobby journalists, and the danger for us and them is if they are not skeptical of any 
official line. In the UK most major news organizations have one or two reporters 
who are “accredited” and have mutually authorized contact with intelligence orga-
nizations. In the UK the agencies, with the exception of GCHQ, do not have press 
offices, and even GCHQ’s is mainly for community liaison. In the US, access seems 
more liberal but varies across the seventeen or so intelligence agencies. Experienced 
journalists from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have told me that media access 
is restricted, difficult, and sometimes tense, unless you are deemed “a safe pair of 
hands,” for which you can read “lacking criticality.” 
When a major story involving national security occurs, an influx of general report-
ers may cover it, making the best contacts they can in the moment and using the 
news organization’s “cuttings” or “clippings” library. This is routine and ephemeral 
and does not deploy any specialist knowledge of the sector. 
Within investigative journalism in developed democratic countries, a subset of 
reporters tends to cover national security. Investigative journalists are largely driven by 
the search for exclusive revelatory stories and not by a particular beat. But by dint of 
stories covered and contacts developed, they usually have areas of special interest that 
they return to. National security is seen to be an important and newsworthy area, and 
for instance, in each of the Five Eyes countries, there are investigative journalists who 
cover national security time and time again. This is the group this chapter’s discussion 
centers on (see fig. 11.1). The US academic Loch Johnson has noted the role of rigor-
ous journalism in bringing accountability to the intelligence world: “I think that (in 
the United States at least) the media has done much more than any other organization 
or group to advance intelligence accountability. Especially investigative journalists, 
in their drive for a good story that might lead to their professional advancement and 
honors (Pulitzers and Polks, for example), have been successful in sniffing out stories 
and alerting elected overseers in Congress to carry out investigations.”7
I conform to this characterization as a journalist who, for a large part of my career, 










































Heidi Blake United Kingdom Buzzfeed
Jim Bronskill Canada Canada Press
Dr. Duncan Campbell United Kingdom Intelligence expert and freelance journalist
David Fisher New Zealand New Zealand Herald
Andrew Fowler Australia Formerly, Australia Broadcasting Corpora-
tion’s Four Corners program
Colin Freeze Canada Globe and Mail
Barton Gellman United States Formerly of the Washington Post, a Pulitzer 
Prize–winning reporter and now a lec-
turer and author in residence at Princeton 
University
Stephen Grey United Kingdom Thomson Reuters
Nicky Hager New Zealand Freelance journalist and NZ’s leading inves-
tigative reporter
Ewen MacAskill United Kingdom Guardian
Mark Mazzetti United States New York Times
Jenna McLaughlin United States The Intercept
Greg Miller United States Covers intelligence and national security for 
the Washington Post and was awarded the 
Pulitzer working with Barton Gellman
Andrew Mitrovica Canada Freelance journalist
Ellen Nakashima United States Washington Post
Dana Priest United States Washington Post
James Risen United States The Intercept
David Seglins Canada CBC
Scott Shane United States New York Times
Jeff Stein United States Covers the spy agencies and foreign policy 
for Newsweek
Peter Taylor United Kingdom BBC TV’s Panorama 
Ali Watkins United States New York Times
Dylan Welch Australia ABC’s 7.30 
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intelligence. While working for the UK’s Independent Newspapers, I was an accred-
ited reporter with the security services, and up to 2008 I dealt with intelligence agen-
cies, including during the controversial weapons of mass destruction; July 7, 2005, 
London bombings; and extraordinary rendition briefings.8 More recently, I became a 
journalism academic practitioner whose research interests include the study of intel-
ligence and media relations. 
Who Are the Intelligence Academics?
A key group of academics this book addresses are those whose discipline is intel-
ligence studies. As a branch of the international relations discipline, intelligence 
studies has as its core academic body the US- centered International Studies Asso-
ciation (ISA). I have engaged with the intelligence studies discipline with varying 
degrees of success over the years, noting reticence to engage from some members of 
that group. Some investigative journalists and some intelligence- focused academics 
contact each other, but to make a generalization based on experience, cooperation 
remains occasional and unsystematic. Richard Norton- Taylor was the Guardian’s 
security correspondent until his recent retirement. He has a reputation for criti-
cal investigative journalism and observed that both journalists and academics can 
get too close to the intelligence people they are researching: “The security and 
intelligence agencies need [us journalists and academics], even more than ‘we’ need 
them especially now with pressure on MI5 (because of terrorist attacks) and on 
MI6 (on the back foot because of lack of protection of their Russian agents and 
over rendition), and GCHQ (desperately in need of recruits and good PR because 
of its increasing role re: cyber, etc.).”9 Why is this important? The intelligence agen-
cies have the potential to exercise power through secrecy that, in certain circum-
stances, has been and again could be undemocratic. John le Carré, with his usual 
erudition, encapsulated the key question for intelligence in “Fifty Years Later,” a 
foreword to a new edition of his novel The Spy Who Came in from the Cold: “How 
far can we go in the rightful defence of our Western values without abandoning 
them along the way?”
As Tina Basi and Mona Sloane have written about the UK higher education 
institutions, academics are driven by targets for affecting public and government 
policy, attracting research funds, and producing high- ranking scholarship.10 “While 
many higher education institutions (HEI) have come up with innovative ways to 
build impact case studies, the focus of impact practices has been increasingly nar-
rowed down to tech transfer or policy impact.” Basi and Sloane critically worry, “The 
‘impact agenda’ is fueled, in part, by a cost- benefit framework.” They place this in 
a wider context: “The discussion of impact is bound by both a poorly articulated 
purpose of higher education within social policy at large and a shift towards the mar-
ketisation of universities.”11
Gill pointed out that academics manifest different approaches to producing 









































those academics who conduct research from those who focus on scholarship. The 
former seeks to mine primary sources for material hitherto unpublished while the 
latter relies primarily on secondary sources and seeks to develop new perspectives, 
models or theories.”12 As Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, and Martha White 
note of the UK intelligence- academic environment, “There has historically been 
a measure of ad- hoc interaction between the UK’s intelligence community with 
individual academics and, of course, with those in privileged or knowledgeable 
positions outside of the community.” They go on to write that although universities 
are “public institutions, albeit funded in an increasingly private way,” they “are a 
key source of knowledge and innovation for the country.”13 The number of former 
intelligence practitioners turned academics is increasing. There are many in United 
States, fewer in the UK; Michael Herman and David Omand (both ex- GCHQ) 
are obvious examples. Over many years I have engaged with intelligence- focused 
academics both as a journalist and as an academic and have observed the following 
distinct groupings. 
The first group, acolytes, see themselves as an academic adjunct of the pro-
fessional intelligence community and seek to analyze and improve intelligence 
methodology. Their closeness to the intelligence community positions them better 
to achieve the career- enhancing grants that will meet impact criteria. This group 
engages in both research and scholarship, and they often share, as Bourdieu might 
have described it, the illusio of the intelligence community.14 These academics are 
often seen by intelligence leaders as useful aides- de- camp but best kept in the vicus 
and not the castrum. (One of the interviewees for this chapter pointed out that 
the idea that intelligence officials may welcome contact with useful outsiders in 
informal environments while not welcoming them into their inner sanctum could 
equally apply to journalists.)15
The second group, historians, seeks to portray the history of intelligence, and 
there tends to be a substantial time lag as official data and interviews with operatives 
may become available only many years after the events described. Some historians are 
sufficiently trusted to write the official histories with access to still classified archives. 
Interestingly, and somewhat counterintuitively, it is this group that is most called on 
by the media to commentate on intelligence- related stories, perhaps as they are seen 
to provide the long view and to have greater “respectability.”
The third group, critical friends, see themselves as rigorous academic analysts of 
the intelligence community and its wider political and social context. They seek an 
overview, even a sense making and search for truth, of the larger ontological question 
of intelligence and, while engaging with the intelligence community, seem to exercise 
resistance to the pull of the intelligence field’s doxa. 
The fourth group, critical theorists, see themselves as very much a counter to the 
intelligence studies grouping and are outsiders, often Marxists, to the intelligence 
community. This group bases its analyses on the negative historical record of the 
intelligence community and can veer into conspiracy theory. They do provide a useful 
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The Commonalities
The first commonality between academics and journalists is that both face the 
shared obstacle intrinsic to obtaining data on intelligence: secrecy. Abram Shulsky 
and Gary Schmitt have observed, “The connection between intelligence and secrecy 
is central to most of what distinguishes intelligence from other intellectual activi-
ties.”16 As Dover, Goodman, and White noted, “The practical business of govern-
ment intelligence and security communities exist, for the most part, in necessary 
secrecy.”17 While secrecy may be an essential of intelligence activity, it can mask 
groupthink, incompetence, illegality, domain expansion, and political meddling. 
Thus intelligence organizations need to be accountable, although the more usual 
open government oversight is not a comfortable fit. As Gill noted in his work on 
the democratization of intelligence, the media must be much more than a mouth-
piece for governments. They are the fourth estate and provide a crucial, if informal, 
accountability mechanism. He recommends they act as a watchdog against corrup-
tion and other abuses of power, including providing an outlet for whistle- blowers, 
and argues that since “formal intelligence oversight mechanisms are often relatively 
weak [it] is often some combination of civil society organisations and the media that 
brings abuses to public attention.”18
Gill also noted that the problem for media in covering security and intelligence 
issues is often presented as one of penetrating the “veil of secrecy,” but that is just 
one dimension of the problem. The job of journalists (and academic researchers) is 
similar in many respects to that of intelligence officers: both are seeking information, 
often from or about people who guard their privacy closely. Even if information can 
be obtained, the problem is making sense of it and drawing some reasonable conclu-
sion.19 The most productive method for journalists to obtain intelligence insights is 
through sources. Access to those working in intelligence is difficult, and if access is to 
be achieved, the question has to be asked, At what cost?20 
Given the protective secrecy and the strength of their habitus and illusio, those 
within intelligence rarely feel compelled to explain themselves or discuss the ethi-
cal and conceptual basis on which they operate. They tend to talk to journalists or 
academics only if they feel they will gain something—the rare exception to this is the 
whistle- blower. While journalists have a good deal of freedom within legal and ethical 
constraints, academics find constraints embedded in the research infrastructure. It is 
clear that to remain relevant to public policy and opinion, academics need to become 
more agile and timely. 
The second commonality is the research cycle, the process of identifying knowl-
edge gaps, collecting information, analyzing it, and reporting it (fig. 11.2).21 Dover, 
Goodman, and White undertook an exercise to see what the intelligence community 
could learn from academics and compared the intelligence cycle with the academic 
research process using the eight- step hourglass model, which they summarize as using 
eight key steps in the research process. “Whilst academic research ‘models’ are nei-









































process of academic research.”22 As a complementary exercise, I extend the com-
parison to include a third element, investigative journalism, using Mark L. Hunter’s 
“story- based inquiry model,” which is widely considered the best practice research 
method for in- depth journalism. Hunter writes that unlike most routine journalism, 
the story- based inquiry model takes “the hypothesis- based inquiry approach, which 
takes the basic assumption that a story is only a hypothesis until verified.”23
The processes of research and analysis in all three cohorts closely correspond. 
The notion of hypothesis works across all cohorts as they use methods (not philo-
sophical truth determinations) that provide the best available means of approach-
ing “truth.” While the journalist does not explicitly state a hypothesis, it is usually 
paraphrased in the introductory sentence or paragraph of the story. As Gill noted, 
he had much sympathy with the idea that what analysts, academics, and journal-
ists are trying to do is “make sense” of the world. “The idea of ‘sensemaking’ seems 
Intelligence cycle
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highly appropriate to issues of such complexity. As someone once said, ‘truth is a 
difficult concept.’”24
Core Differences
The three cohorts are in other regards quite different. Funding is different for each 
of the three groups, and Gill observed that, for academics, funding is more crucial 
for research than scholarship: “The former seeks to mine primary sources for material 
hitherto unpublished while the latter relies primarily on secondary sources and seeks 
to develop new perspectives, models or theories.” But, he adds, perhaps it is less so 
now that so much material is available online: 
There has never been much funding available for academic research into 
intelligence but I believe much can be done without it. Now I think there 
will be more funding available for historical research than social science 
research into current organisational/governance issues because they raise 
trickier questions of getting access and may frighten donors. The lack of 
availability of big grants for research into intelligence (compared with elec-
tions, parties etc.) is one of a number of reasons why the number of intel-
ligence studies academics is so small. Academics don’t really face the risk of 
capture by funders but may risk capture by agencies if they seek to bargain 
access for control over output.25
Gill warned that even though there are differences in funding, journalists are also not 
free agents and will be subject to whatever editorial constraints are put on them. In 
many cases these restraints will reflect the preferences of owners and, in turn, may be 
shaped by informal or formal pressures from the state.26 
A second difference is dissemination. Dr. Duncan Campbell observed, “In jour-
nalism, we publish, and meet legal, professional, and/or situational restrictions and 
responses. We are de facto subject to ‘review’ (taking a very broad meaning) by any-
one without restriction including targets of enquiries.” By comparison, he noted, 
“intelligence reports are ‘disseminated’ only to selected recipients, who are likely to 
be de facto paying or payment enabling customers, with strict and severe controls. 
The broad ‘reviews’ consequent on genuine publication are wholly and inevitably 
absent.”27 The main academic dissemination is in peer- reviewed journals for which 
the audience is usually in three figures if the metrics are to be believed.
A third difference is in the collection of information. Sources are used across all 
groups, but academics do not tend to use sources in the same way as either journalists 
or intelligence officers. Gill noted, “Covert methods are standard and essential for 
intelligence, OK sometimes for journalists subject to editors and codes and regula-
tors; but rarely OK in academic studies.” He expanded the point, saying it is easier 









































specifically empowered to infringe on privacy and deploy many methods to gather 
information covertly: “Journalists do not possess such legal powers but may well 
deploy various forms of subterfuge up to and including illegal behaviour in order to 
gather what is not publicly available. How else could investigative journalism pro-
ceed? Once gathered, much effort is made to protect not just what has been learnt 
but also the sources.”28
When it comes to technologically assisted intelligence, neither journalists nor aca-
demics can rival GCHQ for technological SIGINT data capture and imagery intel-
ligence. That said, the availability of commercial imagery and the broader availability 
of open source information has empowered journalists and academics. For example, 
the crowd- sourced investigative group Bellingcat has done quite remarkable work 
with commercially available satellite imagery, notably in the case of the Malaysian 
airliner shot down over Ukraine in 2014. In this example, Bellingcat made a strong 
case for a mobile Russian missile launcher unit to have been the culprit.29
A fourth difference is confidentiality. Information barriers are common to all three 
cohorts. They are especially prevalent in intelligence but are very small in academia. 
While predisposed to publication, journalists have an ontological duty of confidenti-
ality to some sources. Academics, in contrast, do not usually operate with live issues, 
so confidentially is not such a concern, except that university ethics committees push 
academics toward confidentiality even when it is not necessary.30
A fifth difference is time. Urgency is a factor for both intelligence and journalist 
groups, whereas academics prioritize perceived authority of reporting. Intelligence 
collection and analysis can be a race against time to prevent catastrophic events. 
Journalism has a publication imperative, but investigative journalists are not so sub-
ject to the 24- 7 news regime. Gill noted academic research is mainly historical and 
therefore urgency does not arise, except if there is a race to publish some new findings 
from recently opened archives. He wrote, “I’d draw a distinction between urgency 
of analysis in a developing counterterrorism investigation compared with anything 
journalists may face, e.g., fear of being beaten to publication by rivals.”31 
As Gill observed, all three cohorts are subject to review by peers: “For intelligence 
analysts, the first people they have to convince with their product are managers who 
intervene between them and the policy people; for academics the equivalent is the 
external reviewer and for journalists, the editor.”32 Dover, Goodman, and White 
observed that intelligence analysis may utilize a range of structured analytical tech-
niques or may be performed without any methodological approach: “Structured 
analytical techniques range from simple brainstorming instructions to the appli-
cation of Subjective Bayesian Analysis.”33 Within intelligence, analysis is a crucial 
element in producing a “product” ready for dissemination and involves assessing 
the credibility of both the information’s source and the information itself. This 
assessment may involve using sophisticated models but at the very minimum will 
involve seeking independent verification or cross- checking different sources.34 The 
argument goes that despite the similarity of interests, journalists, unlike academics, 
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framed around speedy delivery to the wider public sphere. Academics are under 
lesser temporal or dissemination imperatives. Gill wrote, “I think academics can 
learn much from investigative journalism, but taking the longer view, I don’t think 
there is any point in academics trying necessarily to produce quicker—it’s more 
important that one’s work passes the test of ‘intersubjectivity.’” However, like jour-
nalists, academics are facing more and more fiscal and productivity pressures in 
their institutions. Some of these are common across international borders, some are 
national in character, and others institutional. There are the systemic pressures of 
an increasingly consumer- driven higher education sector. Contemporary research 
academics express incredulity at the suggestion that they still have time to read and 
think within their contracted work hours.
The sixth difference lies in the ethics mechanisms. Professional journalists oper-
ate with an ethical framework, and ethics is integral to most journalism university 
training syllabi. In the UK most belong to the National Union of Journalists, which 
has an ethical structure and code, and they are also subject to self- regulation (print), 
an official regulatory body (broadcast), and the law. Nevertheless, they are generally 
free to contact potential interviewees without much ado, unless the interviewees are 
vulnerable or under the age of eighteen. Only when it comes to undercover work for 
interviews do matters become more complicated, especially for public service broad-
casters, for whom the regulatory bodies now stringently require compelling evidence 
that subterfuge is justified.
In contrast, even if it is possible for academics to interview former and current 
intelligence officers, they almost certainly could not interview people on the periph-
ery, like agents and contractors. In some cases these peripheral characters have engaged 
in criminal activity, and ethics committees are reticent to let academics interview 
criminals (unless they are in prison and supervised) or to enter environments where 
criminal activity may take place. From my experience, academic ethics committees 
tend to be one- size- fits- all enterprises and prefer risk- averse proposals. An academic’s 
prior experience of these situations often holds no sway, and researchers who have 
previously done ethnographic work in environments frequented by criminals are just 
as likely to have their projects rejected as inexperienced doctoral researchers. These 
ethics committees and processes also push academics toward confidentiality for inter-
viewees, which reduces their ability to fully authenticate their sources as valuable. (In 
fairness, insider sources will normally insist of anonymity anyway.) This is because 
these committees, in seeking to protect the vulnerable, treat all groups as though they 
are unable to see the bigger picture. It is as if highly experienced people from law 
enforcement and intelligence cannot manage their own risks, even though in most 
cases the potential interviewees have been doing just that for their entire careers. The 
danger of ethics committees is that they can infantilize both the academic and the 
sources. Ethics committees need to consider ethics from a real world rather hypothet-
ical perspective. If journalists were subject to such committees, little quality reporting 
would ever be undertaken. Some of the most important research is to be found in 









































How Can Journalists and Intelligence- Focused  
Academics Cooperate?
For academic engagement with the public debate to be made timelier, all academ-
ics will have to challenge systemic barriers like overly rigorous ethics approval and 
the slow peer review publication process. Academics in the intelligence- related dis-
ciplines could, if so minded, take their cue from the journalists and improve certain 
areas. As noted, one measure academics have to consider now is impact. When an 
intelligence story breaks, journalists turn to existing or former intelligence insiders 
or oversight entities or even politicians. Stuart Hall and colleagues noted decades ago 
the role of elite interviewers, who they characterized as “primary definers. . . . Such 
spokesmen are understood to have access to more accurate or specialized information 
on particular topics than the majority of the population.”35 I argue that the debate 
around Snowden was framed within the first weeks, if not days, of the story. Here the 
notion of an elite discourse fits well with Hall and colleagues’ way of thinking about 
where the debate was framed.36 After the Snowden leaks, in most of the Five Eyes 
countries, the debate was polarized: government and the intelligence community, 
supported by parts of the press, stood on one side against the Snowden release, and 
journalists, some politicians, and considerable elements of civil society stood on the 
other, defending Snowden’s release. 
Some academics do seek to get op- ed pieces in the media and are available to 
comment on major events in intelligence. In recent years academics, with encourage-
ment from their universities, have been seeking to influence policy by writing for 
commentary websites, like The Conversation in Australia and Open Democracy in 
the UK. Although the actual impact is not yet clear, these websites do get accessible 
academic analysis into the public sphere quickly. Being concise and engaging is not 
a skill known to all academics. Richard Norton- Taylor noted, “Whenever there is an 
incident, I get a stream of comments or offers of comments from academics and uni-
versities and the vast majority of the comments are extremely banal.”37 Countering, 
Gill noted that in the post- Snowden debate, academics have started to make contri-
butions in other ways that are quicker than waiting for journal or book publication: 
“There were several post- Snowden inquiries: by the Intelligence and Security Com-
mittee (ISC), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and that conducted by the 
UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism legislation, David Anderson, to which aca-
demics contributed and in some cases were invited to public hearings. For example, 
I appeared with John Naughton, Julian Richards before ISC. Whether any of us had 
any impact on their conclusions, let alone policy, is another matter!”38 
Interdisciplinarity 
For investigative journalists to work with academics would require a level of interdisci-
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Their stories come from diverse sources, and journalists tend not to be constrained 
by boundaries. How about academics? Most universities say they encourage multi- or 
interdisciplinarity, and grant- awarding councils and bodies see it as advantage. This 
seems to work best in the sciences. As a research academic, I am surprised, despite 
the rhetoric, how reluctant academics, especially social scientists, are to engage with 
other related disciplines. When it enables understanding, I use an interdisciplinary 
approach, incorporating useful concepts from outside journalism studies. I have 
engaged with the intelligence studies discipline, in which there are discourse and 
methodologies for testing theory. My experience in the UK is that the silos are still 
concrete and not yet porous. Intelligence studies academics seem reluctant to inte-
grate with security studies, surveillance studies, or terrorism studies and vice versa. 
Perhaps my view is harsh, as Gill argues that intelligence studies is itself at least mul-
tidisciplinary, if not interdisciplinary.
There is a small but growing discourse around intelligence and the media that a 
cross- discipline engagement adds value. However, as a journalism academic, I have 
felt deliberately discouraged by colleagues in UK intelligence studies at times. Some 
positively arbitrate against journalists (including journalism academics) attending 
their events or engaging in discourse. This is especially true when current or even for-
mer intelligence operatives are present. Essentially they think the presence of some-
one who has journalistic credentials will deter contributions from “the industry.” It 
is worth noting that journalism practitioners do understand Chatham House Rules, 
which state that “participants are free to use the information received, but neither the 
identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be 
revealed.”39 There have been some moves to persuade intelligence- focused academics 
to be more multidisciplinary, notably by Mark Phythian (see chapter 1 in this book).
Matters to Consider 
Journalists are often quite willing to share their research material with academics 
once their story has been disseminated, as they frequently obtain far more data than 
they are able to use. I have noticed, however, that academics seem reluctant to use 
documents unless they are released by official sources or archives. For example, sur-
prisingly little use has been made of the WikiLeaks Cablegate documents, a treasure 
trove of US State Department analysis of a wide range of countries, though some 
have suggested to me that could be because US academics who might want to obtain 
a security clearance in the future are reluctant to use Wikileaks documents. Such 
sensitivities do not cross the minds of journalists, who believe that “information is 
information” and the source of information is less important than its verification. 
In addition to access to research material, academics might see other benefits of 
engaging with investigative journalists. A journalist who has been considering intel-
ligence for many decades, for example, can bring mature subjectivity to the topic, 










































In the last decade or so, journalists have turned from being solo, retentive story hunt-
ers to far more collaborative operators. There have now been many stories in which 
journalists have collaborated across borders to exploit data leaks. The series of data 
leaks regarding offshore banking secrecy have been exemplary and have taught many 
lessons. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists worked with the 
German newspaper Suddeutsche Zeitung and more than a hundred other media part-
ners over the course of a year to sift “through 11.5 million leaked files to expose the 
offshore holdings of world political leaders, links to global scandals, and details of the 
hidden financial dealings of fraudsters, drug traffickers, billionaires, celebrities, sports 
stars and more.”40 Academics of course often have international connections, and 
intelligence studies academics have the annual ISA conference. But it is worth con-
sidering whether these kinds of groupings could become more proactive in analyzing 
the contemporary landscape. Intelligence has international real- time links, and that 
raises serious oversight issues to consider and monitor.
Forums 
In the UK, journalists and academics from a range of security and international rela-
tions disciplines meet in certain venues, like the Royal United Services Institute and 
Chatham House. In the US, they meet in venues such as the Brookings Institution in 
Washington. Some UK intelligence and security research groups invite investigative 
journalists to attend meetings and conferences. Duncan Campbell, for example, was 
invited to a Ditchley Foundation conference to discuss the impact of Snowden.41 
Norton- Taylor, the most respected UK security correspondent, was invited regularly 
to such events but said he had attended only twice.42 The picture across the Five 
Eyes countries is varied, with the US being rather more open than others, especially 
with the intelligence- focused departments in its higher education institutions, like 
Georgetown University and University of Texas–Austin. Most specialist centers in 
UK universities do not engage with journalists. Academics could seek to organize 
forums in which intelligence matters are addressed by investigative journalists with 
experience in the field. The UK has a need for a new intelligence forum and research 
hub (similar in principle to the security hub created by a consortium of universities 
led by Lancaster University) that would engage more systematically with investigative 
journalists with national security interests.43 
Conclusion 
The academic, often sitting in a single- occupancy office, is still often a lone operator 
and may benefit from a more collaborative and timely approach. This chapter argues for 
greater engagement and interdisciplinarity. Dover, Goodman, and White noted the key 
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intelligence picture.”44 This can be extended to include journalists, especially those with 
a national security specialization. While intelligence- focused academic research and 
scholarship have integrated well- tested methodologies, academics might benefit from 
studying the ways and ethos of investigative journalism. Engagement might also reduce 
the polarization that featured so destructively in the Snowden debate. Taking their cue 
from investigative journalists, academics might consider a more proactive approach, 
perhaps taking on more contemporary research instead of historical scholarship and 
forgoing the consequential delay and lack of impact of the peer- reviewed publication 
process. However, the journalist- academic relationship is not a one- way street. Academ-
ics can also bring insight to journalists in understanding the processes of intelligence.
Given the too frequent failure of official oversight and accountability mechanisms 
for intelligence entities, there is a clear need for rigorous external monitoring from 
journalists and academics alike. In the UK I was involved with the interdisciplin-
ary project DataPSST!, which successfully trialed this approach.45 Despite the rev-
elations from and the debate over the Snowden case, it caused only a delay, rather 
than a rethink, of the expansion of Five Eyes’ capability and mass surveillance. Bulk 
collection (as the intelligence community likes to frame it) continues its dangerous 
expansion; a US intelligence agency report stated the NSA had collected more than 
500 million phone call records from Americans in 2017, more than triple the num-
ber gathered in 2016.46 And there are new problems to confront. As this chapter 
was being written, Privacy International released a report titled Secret Global Surveil-
lance Networks: Intelligence Sharing between Governments and the Need for Safeguards, 
which warned of “alarming weaknesses” in the oversight arrangements governing 
intelligence sharing between state agencies.47 Engagement between journalists and 
academics would see enhanced cooperation and agility from the journalism side but 
also more measure and proportionality from the academic side.48 
There is work to be done. As Phythian points out, ethical issues are inseparable 
from intelligence activities and, like the question of failure, can take in the entire 
intelligence cycle:
Targeting of “friendly” states, the very notion of covert surveillance, and 
the more intrusive forms of collection, together with the question of covert 
action and other intelligence- led policy responses, all raise fundamental eth-
ical questions. There is a growing body of work on this subject most recently 
clearly informed by developments in the “war on terror,” specifically the 
torture debate in the US and the associated question of extraordinary rendi-
tion, in effect the outsourcing of torture by the US. Hence, more than ever 
before there is a need to adapt the just war paradigm to construct a concept 
of jus in intelligentia.49
An ethical failure that brings a short- term gain (of information) but a long- term loss 
(of moral high ground) is illustrated in the case of Libyan dissident Abdel Hakim 









































rendition to Muammar al- Qaddafi’s Libya, where the dissident was imprisoned and 
tortured. In 2018 British prime minister Theresa May had to make a full public apol-
ogy for the rendition in front of the world.50 Compelling evidence of British collusion 
in rendition had exposed a government cover- up. On matters of such importance, a 
mature dialogue across disciplines with experienced practitioners and academics may 
prevent repeating the mistakes of history.
Notes
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lecturer at King’s College, University of London.
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